

## INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON MYANMAR MILITARY COUP

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**ABSTRACT:** *The people of Myanmar have been living under a military dictatorship for more than 50 years, and about five years ago they achieved their dream of a partial democracy. However, on February 1, the Myanmar military staged a coup d'état again that suddenly stifled the country's democratic transition, sparking mass protests that could lead to deadly violence. The generals accused their movement of being constitutional alleging fraud in November 2020 elections about the National League for Democracy (NLD) defeat the military-backed party. This paper is to analyze how International communities respond to a military coup in Myanmar. This paper used the reference sources used for reference in this paper are derived from reliable sources, as well as from Google Scholar and also the paper publication of national and international journals.*

**KEYWORDS** -Military coup, Perspectives of international communities

### I. INTRODUCTION

Myanmar people had got the dream of a partially democratic country in their minds in about the last recently 5 years because they lived under the military dictatorship for over 50 years (Bhattacharya & Raghuvanshil, 2021; Chowdhury, 2021). Due to the abuse of power by successive military dictators, selfishness, the lack of patriotism, Myanmar has become an outdated country in the middle of the world (Abhinav Mehrotra, 2021). Last year, on 8th November 2020, general elections were held across Myanmar. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won an outright majority, winning 396 of the 476 seats while the military-backed party, the United Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won 33 (Andrews, 2021; Bünte, 2021; Khanthavit, 2021; Roza, 2021; Seekins, 2021). The USDP alleges massive fraud and they demand that the Union Elections Commission (UEC) investigated allegations of voting irregularities, but UEC, independent monitors did not report any evidence (Bhattacharya & Raghuvanshil, 2021). On January 26, 2021, a military spokesman warned it would "take action" if the election dispute was not resolved (Andrews, 2021).

So on that 1st February, Aung San Suu Kyi as the state counselor as well as Foreign Minister had been detained by the Myanmar military (Seekins, 2021). Not only Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, members of Parliaments, many cabinet members, and political activists were also arrested (Andrews, 2021; Bhattacharya & Raghuvanshil, 2021; Chowdhury, 2021; Khanthavit, 2021; Ra & Ju, 2021; Roza, 2021; Vernon, 2021). In addition, the military also declared a state of emergency and took over power for at least one year (A. Arshad & Delhi, 2021). Millions of people have protested the coup, in nearly every township of the country every day even though during the pandemic Covid-19 (Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), 2021). Civilian resistance to the coup has been so widespread, creative, and courageous than, it caught the military by surprise. The military has turned democratic protests into a bloodbath that mainly targeted civilians who voted for the NLD (A. Arshad & Delhi, 2021). So far many people were also arbitrarily arrested, many of whom were subjected to enforced disappearances. Thousands more were injured and detained during these apparently coordinated attacks in every place across the country. From the military coup on 1 Feb 2021 up to August 26, at least 1019 people have been killed so far Myanmar's military continues to use brutal methods to quell anti-coup protests, nearly 7589 people have been unfairly arrested, 5969 were currently detained and 1984 were issued

warrant according to the Association for Assistance to Political Prisoners (AAPP). The humiliating, cowardly, and brutal acts of the military and police which were filmed shooting protesters as they fled, and which did not even save small children so we must stop it immediately. The international community has a responsibility to protect the people of Myanmar from atrocities.

## **II. RESEARCH METHODS**

This type of research is qualitative research, which is a series of studies related to library data collection methods, or research whose research objects are explored through various library information (books, encyclopedias, scientific journals, news-papers, magazines, news, and documents). Research is the basic foundation for researchers to formulate the reality of the problem, virtual articles, literature studies, and data validity that are clear in their existence. The nature of this research is descriptive analysis, namely the regular breakdown of the data that has been obtained, then understanding and explanation are given so that it can be understood well by the reader.

## **III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **3.1 The Tatmadaw, as the Myanmar military is called**

In Myanmar's history, military rule has occurred since 1962(Ra & Ju, 2021)(Bünthe, 2021). At that time, the U Nu faction was overthrown in a military coup led by General Ne Win and made Burma (changed to Myanmar in 2010) into a socialist state with a single party (Burma Socialist Programme Party) and banned independent newspapers(Kramer, 2021). In 1988 the people of Myanmar protested against the military rule so that the government declared martial law. Thousands of people have been arrested, including supporters of democracy and human rights. National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest. On 27 May 1990, the first lower house elections were held under the new military government. Even though the NLD won a landslide victory in these elections, the results were ignored by the military. In 2007, public protests took place again. This attitude was triggered by the increase in the price of fuel oil. Dozens of activists were arrested and Buddhist monks staged a series of anti-government protests (Saffron Revolution) (Fearon & Francois, 2021).

On 1st February 2021, the clock on Myanmar's democratic transition was also turned back many years with 1962 style (A. Arshad & Delhi, 2021) and also 1988-style (Seekins, 2021) military coup. The military claimed that the November 2020 election, which the NLD party won by a landslide, was somehow a 'fraud', without providing any evidence (Chowdhury, 2021). As a result, early on February 1, 2021, the military overthrew the civilian government in an illegal coup. After declaring itself the "State Administrative Council" (SAC), the military junta began committing human rights abuses, including beatings, forced disappearances, and freedom of rights. The coup completely overthrew the rule of law in Myanmar(Andrews, 2021).

### **3.2 2008 New Constitution**

The military junta introduced some political reforms in May 1990. The State Law and Order Restoration Council-SLORC organized general elections in which the opposition NLD party won a landslide victory. But the junta refused to hand over power and instead started a National Convention to draft a new constitution, which was only finalized in 2008(Kramer, 2021)(Roza, 2021). In 2008, the army planned the allocation of a quarter of military seats in the Myanmar parliament through a constitutional amendment(Bünthe, 2021). Myanmar army has veto power over constitutional amendments and they are very powerful and very rich because they manage many companies and have links to industry such as jade and ruby mining, tobacco beer, manufacturing sector, tourism, banking, transportation, and etc(Chowdhury, 2021). In 2010, elections were held but the NLD party was canceled to participate in the elections by the Union Election Council-UEC Law. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development party-USDP claimed a glorious victory in its first election even though opposition parties accused it of fraud and the election was seen as a hoax. After the election, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest(Fearon & Francois, 2021).

In the 2012 By-election, the regional election monitoring agency Asian for Free Election (ANFREL) reported on the dynamics of the Myanmar elections. In the “International Election Observation Mission Republic of the Union of Myanmar By-Elections of November 3” (2018, 36-40), to fill the vacant 48 seats in parliament, the NLD won 43 seats and Aung San Suu Kyi was elected. Then in 2015, Myanmar held elections. The NLD’s victory was followed by the appointment of Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor of Myanmar. Even though the 2015 elections resulted in a civilian government in Myanmar, the military’s influence is still very strong. This is because, based on the 2008 Constitution, 25% of the seats in parliament are filled by the military (Fearon & Francois, 2021).

### **3.3 Democracy in Myanmar**

Myanmar had been the heaven of rebel groups for a long and military dominance for more than 50 years deterred economic progress and social uplift (Drechsler, 2021). Right of journalism decimated and the power of the free press remained restricted for a prolonged period of time (Bünthe, 2021). Democratic rights of people had been truncated and social repression remained rampant under military rule. After 50 years of military oppression, democracy returned to Myanmar with the parliamentary election in November 2015 under the leadership of National League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi which received a majority to form a government (Fearon & Francois, 2021). But the problem was far from over. Her regime faced allegations from the western front and the UN when the human rights violation was reported against an army that led to an exodus of millions of Rohingya minority. Elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi showed apathy or failed to take a stand against mass genocide against Muslim minorities and military leaders perpetrated the heinous crimes against Rohingya Muslims. Two Reuter journalists had been apprehended with false allegations of state secrecy laws circumvention and sentenced to seven years of imprisonment for covering the Rohingya crisis (Bhattacharya & Raghuvanshil, 2021).

Overall, after the general election in Nov 2010, Myanmar has moved away from closed authoritarianism but is not yet a full-fledged democracy (Bünthe, 2021). This falls under the category of hybrid regimes, which are understood in the literature as 'not clearly democratic or conventionally authoritarian'. Myanmar is often seen as an illiberal democracy (Fearon & Francois, 2021).

### **3.4 Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)**

The military didn’t delay overthrowing the elected government in 2021, brought unreliable charges against democratic leaders, and seized control over political and social apparatus hurriedly in February 2021. Telephone and internet services were withheld with immediate notice for several cities. Television broadcasting had been stalled and domestic and international flights had been called off. The activities at the stock market and commercial banks were stopped and shutters were pulled down. Panic-stricken people queued up in front of ATMs at several locations. Residents of Yangon which happened to be the largest city of Myanmar rushed to market to stockpile groceries and food items in fear of imminent scarcity. Millions of people poured onto the streets in a peaceful demonstration against the military coup (Bhattacharya & Raghuvanshil, 2021; Khanthavit, 2021; Roza, 2021). The military coup has also been challenged by the people of Myanmar itself through the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) which was first launched on February 2, 2021 by medical staff from more than 110 government hospitals and health departments in about 50 cities across Myanmar in protest against the takeover of power by the military and the imposition of a state of emergency by the military (Drechsler, 2021). The CDM now includes engineers, doctors, bank employees, private company staffs, teachers, students, civil servants, some police, diverse ethnic nationalities, LGBTIQ people, and religious leaders and others who seek to challenge the coup by striking (Andrews, 2021; Seekins, 2021). With regard to the civil disobedience of Myanmar citizens that quickly spread through social media, the Myanmar military government through the Ministry of Transportation and Communications is trying to quell the popular protest movement by blocking the internet nationally.

Myanmar’s civil disobedience movement shows that a military coup is unwanted by the majority of Myanmar’s people. Civil government based on the results of the 2020 General Election is the absolute desire of

the people in a democratic country. They demand peacefully the military coup to immediately stop the use of force and violence against citizens, to release of all detainees, including President U Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and finally to promptly return all rights to the democracy chosen by the people in the election the last year November(Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), 2021).

### **3.5 Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)**

Despite the coup, parliamentarians have sought to fulfill their duties. On 8 February 2021, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) officially announced its formation, condemned the coup, recognized CDM and the long-sought goal of a federal union(Andrews, 2021). The CRPH convened over 300 parliamentarians, on 5 February, in line with the parliament's expected duties; established a foreign delegation based in the US; informed all Myanmar diplomatic missions that they should be accountable to the CRPH, rather than the military coup; and established a plan of action for civilians to uphold their democracy until the legitimate government is back in power(Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), 2021).

### **3.6 The National Unity Government (NUG)**

The National Unity Government (NUG) is an interim unity government approved by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Representative Committee (CRPH) on 16 April 2021 under the Federal Democracy Treaty promulgated on 31 March 2021. There are 14 of ministries as of 1 July 2021. The government includes members of parliament who won the 2020 election; Representatives of ethnic groups; Includes prominent figures from anti-coup protests. The NUG has demanded that the international community recognize them as the legitimate government of Myanmar. U Lwin Ko Latt, who has been appointed Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration, said he hoped to be recognized by some of the world's major powers in the near future. The International Trade Union Confederation calls on international governments and the United Nations to recognize the NUG. The NUG plans to reimburse the salaries of civil servants participating in the CDM, especially junior ones, and fund them from donations, and freeze Myanmar government assets abroad (Drechsler, 2021).

In 19th June, The NUG calls for rapid and expanded humanitarian assistance to save the lives of all people in Myanmar. The recent military coup and ongoing atrocity crimes committed by the junta have yet again plunged our people into a complex political and humanitarian emergency(NUG Organization, 2021).

### **3.7 International Community as a Sociological Concept**

The concept of the 'international community' encompasses two main disciplinary perspectives(Schmidt, 2015). First, a legal perspective that focuses on the nature and extent of the norms and principles that form the constitutional core of international law. The international legal community arises when states consensually agree to establish certain constitutional elements that establish the basic criteria for global lawmaking. Mosler (1980) may be a classic exponent of this view, but it is also present in the work of Tomuschat (1993) and Fassbender (2009).

The kind of 'international community' that can generate collective action and shared ethical standards globally can be extrapolated through and against international law, but also goes beyond and presupposes any normative order based on state consent and individual interests. Even if the international community is understood in the minimal sense of being a legal entity with a prudential constitution, there must be some kind of common interest and pre-existing social purpose that animates the formation of such a constitution. In other words, the public interest does not arise from a normative vacuum, and the question of the normative purpose of a legal system logically precedes its concrete organization.

If one comes to the 'international community' from a second sociological perspective, the focus shifts to a somewhat more abstract level. Here, it is far less about the role and rule of law than it is about the degree of human interconnectedness, a sense of shared ownership, and the construction and perception of what distinguishes 'We' from 'Others'.

### **3.8 Perspectives of International Community**

## **1. United Nations**

This year February 1 incident sparked uprisings across Burma, and Myanmar news topped the world. The February 1 coup took place not only in Myanmar politics but also in world politics. Important figures in Myanmar politics, such as ASEAN, United States, China, United Nations, Europe have responded in a variety of ways. International leaders swiftly condemned the coup and repression of peaceful protests. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet expressed fear and disapproval. Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, said: “the state of emergency” in Myanmar is the military itself.” The UNSC has not moved beyond making a relatively mild statement expressing “deep concern” about the state of emergency and restrictions on civil society, journalists, and media workers. Past UNSC engagement has spurred reaction from the Tatmadaw, such as its 2003 7-point roadmap to democracy (Fearon & Francois, 2021).

The role of the United Nations will remain dormant in the Security Council. Russia and China have traditionally prevented international scrutiny. A stronger-than-expected condemnation of the coup in the council's initial statement could indicate that Myanmar is in complete opposition to the role of the United Nations, even if it is not possible to provide any means to pressure the council. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has vowed to work for a coup d'état. According to a statement from the council, UN special envoy to Myanmar Christine Schraner Burgener could act as an intermediary between the military and regional and global capitals (Aung, 2021; Roza, 2021).

For about four months after the military coup in Burma, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) held a rare referendum on Friday, June 18, calling for an end to the February 1 coup and the arms trade. The UN passed the resolution by a vote of 119 to 1, with 36 abstentions. In addition to condemning the junta and calling for the return of democratic rule in Myanmar, the resolution also called on all UN member states to prevent the flow of weapons to Myanmar.

It has been hailed by the international community, including Silvio Gonzato, the ambassador of the EU delegation, and has been hailed by the international community as a total violation of fundamental democratic norms and a rare manifestation and not to pay attention to the will of the people (Peters, C (2021). In addition to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, several members of China, Russia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, abstained from voting on the resolution.

## **2. European Commission and Western Countries**

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, and EU High Representative Josep Borrell condemned the coup (Vernon, 2021). World leaders expressed their support for democratic governance in Burma, including US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, the Spanish Prime Minister, and the Foreign Ministries of France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Iran, New Zealand, and Australia (Andrews, 2021; Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), 2021). Calls by the UK and EU resulted in a special session of the UN Human Rights Council, which ultimately issued a council resolution that did not mention the coup or call for accountability for actors involved (Vernon, 2021). The World Bank Group announced that it had halted disbursements on its operations in Myanmar and was putting in place enhanced monitoring of projects already underway (Andrews, 2021).

The EU first agreed to impose sanctions on Myanmar's military dictatorship and some officials from its companies in mid-February. But it took weeks for the plans to be officially approved. The second round of sanctions in April targeted a dozen junta officials as well as military-owned companies such as Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and the Myanmar Economic Corporation. Experts question the new EU sanctions on Myanmar, which go against policy. There are also concerns about the effectiveness of sanctions. Foreign Affairs chief, Josep Borrell said on Thursday that the third round of sanctions would be imposed soon on the military and economic interests.

The coup escalated the country's seven decades of insurgency, and many ethnic armed groups are now working together to oppose the junta. The NUG, an underground government formed by opposition to the

military dictatorship, including ousted lawmakers, recently announced its own military, the People's Defense Force (PDF). As tensions continue to rise, most foreign powers, including the EU, have publicly backed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in pursuing a conflict resolution (David Hutt, 2021).

To further complicate matters, the EU is stepping up its sanctions on the military junta, but at the same time trusting Asean to find a solution that will lead to a legitimate solution to those in Brussels. In a recent announcement of further sanctions on Jakarta during a visit to Jakarta, EU foreign policy chief Borrell added that "efforts to find a political solution for Myanmar belong to ASEAN.

### **3. ASEAN**

The response from ASEAN community so far has been anything but significant, as individual member states show dissenting views. Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, Prawit Wongsuwan, stated that the coup is Myanmar's internal affairs. The Philippine's Foreign Minister, Teodoro Locsin Jr. argued that the coup in Myanmar was a necessary act in order to protect democracy in Myanmar. Cambodian leader Hun Sen described it as Myanmar's internal affairs and declined to comment further. At the same time, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have expressed concern over the situation in Myanmar and called on all parties to meet (Roza, 2021).

ASEAN released a unified statement on 1 February encouraging "pursuance of dialogue, reconciliation and the return to normalcy in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar." On 24 February, Thailand hosted the military-appointed Foreign Minister in meetings with the Thai Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, the junta's first overseas engagement since the coup. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also met the junta's representative in Thailand. Foreign Minister Marsusi affirmed Indonesia's intention to communicate with all parties, including the CRPH (Andrews, 2021). On 2 March ASEAN reiterated its position, with Malaysia separately calling for the "prompt and unconditional release of political leaders," including President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi (Cossa, 2021). Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called the security forces' violence against unarmed civilians "inexcusable" and noted that "there will be serious adverse consequences for Myanmar and the region" if the situation continues to escalate.

ASEAN has also released a five-point statement on the crisis in Myanmar, demanding the "immediate cessation of violence" and calling on all parties in the country to exercise "utmost restraint" held in 24th April. It also added that "a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN" (ALJAZEERA, 2021). Five Point of Consensus On the situation in Myanmar, the Leaders reached consensus on the following (Cossa, 2021):

- 1) There shall be immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint.
- 2) Constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.
- 3) A special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN.
- 4) ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre.
- 5) The special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned.

Brunei's Deputy Foreign Minister Erywan Pehin Yusof met with coup leader Min Aung Hlaing and nominated him for a special envoy list during his visit to Myanmar in early June. Indonesia wants to show its usefulness in stabilizing Myanmar and strengthen President Joko Widodo's position. Indonesia believes that Hassan, as a special envoy, can accelerate to a solution, according to a second ASEAN source. But the military appears to be relying on the Thai candidate. The Myanmar military, as it is known, is, in part, no longer interested in Indonesia's democratic transition, preferring a Thai-style military with superior political and policy influence. This will surely be a big problem for ASEAN if Myanmar is cracked down on (The Jakarta Post, 2021).

Malaysia was also interested in a diplomatic post but did not push as hard as Indonesia. So far, Singapore has not nominated any candidates. As of July 6, five months after Myanmar's military overthrew a democratically elected government, ASEAN has not been able to appoint a special envoy to help resolve its political crisis.

On August 4, Brunei's second Foreign Minister Erywan Yusof was appointed special envoy to Myanmar by the ASEAN. He has a responsibility to end the violence in Myanmar and to open dialogue between the military dictatorship and its opposition in a troubled country, the bloc's foreign ministers said in a statement issued at a meeting on Monday and Wednesday. He also called on the "ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Aid" to begin policy-making, along with the provision of humanitarian aid packages (Allard.T, 2021).

### **3.9 Perspectives of Neighbouring countries**

#### **1. China**

Many countries, such as the United States, have condemned the coup and expressed "deep concern" about Myanmar's situation. But China's response has been relatively quiet. After the coup, China restricted its relationships with the ethnic armed groups (EAOs) and the NLD and NUG governments as well. Instead, continued to talk to the military about economic cooperation. China has blocked a UN Security Council resolution condemning the coup and has refused to comment on the human rights situation at the UN Human Rights Council (Ramachandran, 2021). China is the first trading partner of Myanmar as well as second-largest investor. Although Myanmar is not an important trading partner for China, its importance in China's foreign policy through the Belt and Road Initiative is growing. In the late 1980s, Sino-Burmese relations reached a stage of strategic cooperation (Hilton, 2013). At the time, Myanmar was under US sanctions. China has always been in Myanmar during this crisis. As part of the human rights abuses downgraded accusations against the military junta, they put an end to international pressure and international aid to Myanmar (Geng, 2007).

Myanmar is an important country for China because of its geographical location and natural resources. China intends to raise the level of its relations with Myanmar to become strategic. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative has also increased the importance of Myanmar to China. China has been the big brother of Myanmar, especially during the economic blockade imposed by the United States of America. China has been on the same side with Myanmar in international affairs and has been defending the Myanmar government in international discussions. China made efforts to participate in the resolution of the internal conflict in Myanmar like the Myanmar military coup on February 1. Myanmar is a neighboring country; so if the situation in Myanmar deteriorates, it will negatively affect China too. After the military coup, Britain called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council regarding the situation in Myanmar, but China opposed it and asked the United Nations not to interfere in Myanmar's internal affairs (Dewi, 2021).

By now, China and Myanmar have a long list of treaties and agreements already signed and approved, such as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Zreik, 2021). In addition to the joint huge economic projects, China is the number one trading partner for Myanmar. Apart from its obvious economic interests, China has an important political role in Myanmar. For example, China plays a positive role in resolving the internal conflict in Myanmar. For the Chinese, security in Myanmar is equivalent to Chinese national security. Myanmar is rich in natural resources and has a strategic geographic location (Myat, 2021) which further encourages the Chinese to invest. The Myanmar people describe the bilateral relationship as (Pauk-Phaw) meaning the relationship of brotherhood. China has always been a faithful friend of Myanmar and has remained by its side in times of economic crises and international pressure, so Myanmar has a special relationship with China too. Long-term and stable friendship with Myanmar allows China access to the Bay of Bengal and other strategic areas in the region, and this fact benefits the joint projects of the two Asian countries in question.

In addition to diplomatic and economic support, the junta needs allies in the international arena to meet defense needs. China will provide some of this support to the Myanmar military, but it is not the only

country that can do so. In recent decades, the military has been actively cultivating other state forces, which has led to a lesser situation than in 1988(Ramachandran, 2021).

## **2. India**

India is in favor of Myanmar's democratic leadership however it does not mean that the Indian government is against Myanmar's military because Myanmar's military has often been supportive and helped India to crack down on northeast militant forces that have their bases set up across Myanmar borders. India shares a 1,643-kilometer border with Myanmar. It borders India, bordering the four northeastern states of Pradesh Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. Myanmar's military helped India many times the India Myanmar bilateral army exercise together for joint exercises operations and training. This is because India remained close to the Myanmar military until a democratic government came to power. India has also supplied 1.5 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines to Myanmar even while the western countries have put pressure against Myanmar's military leaders(Chowdhury, 2021).

Following the coup, the Military junta demanded that the Indian government return policemen to Myanmar. But India has not yet deported them. Instead, New Delhi has signaled that it does not welcome Myanmar nationals fleeing to India. According to Mizo political activist Hminga Liana, deporting police officers or blocking the entry of people of Myanmar fleeing would anger the Burmese people. As a result, India could lose popular friendship in Myanmar. So far, India's strategy has been to balance the military and pro-democracy activists in Myanmar by maintaining a relationship with both military leaders as well as the civil government. The Indian foreign secretary has also said in a statement that India will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Myanmar(Ramachandran. S, 2021).

## **3. Thailand**

In Myanmar, on February 1, with an unexpected coup and violent clashes between protesters and security forces, Thailand was trapped between a rock and a rough spot. Thailand's foreign and security policymakers have adopted three strategies. The first strategy of "good neighbor" was the main theme when it came to Myanmar. After the coup, Thailand remained silent for good reasons. Therefore, according to the first comment that came from a Foreign Ministry spokesman, Thailand wants a peaceful solution through dialogue and reconciliation. The second strategy is to abide by the ASEAN agreements and principles contained in the ASEAN Charter. Most importantly, ASEAN expressed Myanmar's readiness to help in a positive way. The third and final strategy is to comply with international humanitarian law (Ruji Auethavornpipat, ANU, 2021).

## **4. Bangladesh**

According to Lieutenant General Md Mahfuzur Rahman (LPR), Myanmar Military rejected the result claiming widespread fraud and demanding reelection. This was not taken into cognizance by election commission. This led to this coup by Myanmar military mainly for two reasons:

- a) Myanmar military was embarrassed that their grievances were not taken into account.
- b) If Myanmar military realizes that if the NLD party continues to exercise civilian rule for the next five years, military influence in politics will directly or indirectly become weak. So on February 1, 2021, the military took power under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.

Because of the Military coup, the committee meeting on Rohingya repatriation between Bangladesh and Myanmar has been postponed following a coup in Myanmar. However, Bangladesh is planning to relocate thousands of Rohingya to Bhasan Char Island in the Bay of Bengal. According to the Bangladesh government, before the coup, Myanmar civilian authorities had finally agreed to rehabilitate over 40,000 'refugees' to the Rakhine province by March/April, cleared out of a list of around 800,000 people drawn up by Dhaka, after years of never-ending talks. However, Bangladesh is in a cautious position in Myanmar and

can be closely monitored by either side ahead of time(Lieutenant General Md Mahfuzur Rahman (LPR), 2021).

### **5. Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh**

According to Jessica Olney and Shabbir Ahmad, refugees in Bangladesh believe that the situation could worsen under the current junta, creating new dangers for the remaining Rohingya in Myanmar and delaying the potential for safe repatriation of the homeless. In recent remarks, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing confirmed these concerns, reiterating that the military does not recognize the Rohingya identity or right to return home. As long as the junta is in power, there will be significant political and economic upheaval in the Rohingya crisis. Legal and judicial questions are unlikely to be answered. But in the early months after the coup, the skeptical remarks of Dr. Sasa and others cast doubt on the departure of the previous NLD government. The National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by the CRPH on 16 April, with some initial doubts as to whether it would condemn its policies on Rohingya exclusion and persecution. But it has taken several steps to distinguish it from the recently overthrown civilian government. On May 20, NUG Special Representative Htin Lin Aung said at the Wilson Center webinar that NUG intends to fully support the readmission of the Rohingya. On May 30, NUG questioned the genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar. It has vowed to work with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to decide.

On June 3, NUG issued a statement advancing policy. The NUG statement called for the abolition of the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship and Outdated Citizenship Law and for the ensuring naturalization of all Myanmar citizens and children born in Myanmar. This means effective recognition of the current citizenship rights of the Rohingya. The June 3 statement clarified the NUG's position on the current International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into military crimes against the Rohingya. In this context, NUG's Rohingya citizenship advocacy and international justice are good signs and they will one day return. As the Rohingya have repeatedly said, Myanmar citizenship right is the most basic guarantee for their future protection. Without justice citizenship, It is difficult to imagine a safe and sustainable return route (Jessica Olney and Shabbir Ahmad, 2021).

## **IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**National Unity Government:** This initiative will push for more rebellion in Myanmar, but there is no way the junta can remove it. By inviting Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to attend the summit, ASEAN has officially allowed the junta. However, the NUG government will use its military wing (unification of all ethnic armed groups) to put enormous pressure on the military and the junta's focus will be lost. It is important to remember that brute force only gives brute force. International pressure, Sanctions, or negotiations will not work. Previously, the military was able to withstand all of these tools. At the same time, the first step in tracking these two could move forward with a military-led administration to secretly or secretly support the return of the Rohingya. Again through 'track two' Rohingya may be encouraged to give space with the 'NUG Government' led by NLD.

**ASEAN:** This will reduce the military's brutality in the rebellion, but the military will not negotiate a transfer of power to the NLD and a return to the barracks. The military understands that this choice will reduce the power of civilian/political forces that do not agree with them. However, they may agree to release all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, in order to fulfill their demand for a stable government by handing over power to an elected government and holding free and fair elections. As long as there are two permanent members of the UN Security Council such as China and Russia, the military will remain their goal.

**Thailand:** The situation in both Myanmar and Thailand makes ASEAN's non-interference principle intolerable. The Thai government's active involvement will put itself in an uncomfortable position at home and so it should be accompanied with its own sincere democratic reforms. As Myanmar's immediate neighbour, it is in Thailand's best interest to manage the regional spill-over effects of the coup. Thailand could do so unilaterally, or by joining ASEAN in ensuring the return of peace and democracy to the peoples of Myanmar.

**India:** India's KALADAN multimodal transport project covers the Bay of Bengal. It is strategic for connecting the Kaladan River and its eastern states through Myanmar's Rakhine State. India has invested heavily in this project. India, including its Western allies, does not want Myanmar to fall into China for geopolitical and cultural reasons. India has covered up its moral crisis on geopolitical grounds for the Rohingya issue but has not been able to cover up its moral crisis during the coup in Myanmar.

**Russia:** Russia is the second-largest arms seller to Myanmar after China. They have deep military cooperation and exchange programs. Following the coup, Russian troops took part in the Myanmar Armed Forces Day parade on March 27, 2021. Russia's deputy defense minister was also present at the time. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, thanked Russia for its actions. Russia does not have a moral crisis in supporting the military rule.

**China:** During a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in 2019, President Xi Jinping said that Myanmar is a strategic partner of China (a strategic partner is a development partner). In response, the senior general said that the military will always be on the Chinese side. These terms have serious meanings. China needs Myanmar for its energy security. China wants to avoid the Strait of Malacca and the uncertain South China Sea as much as possible. The Chinese government has no moral character in supporting the junta.

**UN:** The UN could not intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and so is the current conflict in Burma. Because the United States strongly supports Israel. There are many supporters of Israel among the people. That is why it is very difficult for any president to not support Israel. Another point is that the United States and Israel are military allies. Israel is also the largest recipient of US aid, most of which is used to buy weapons. The latest conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has also led to differences of opinion in many parts of the world. The UN will not be able to intervene, and neither Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas nor Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is ready to compromise. Therefore, as long as there is support from China and Russia, Myanmar Military continues to escalate its use of violence including violating the right to life, the right to freedom of assembly, the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and the right to freedom of expression.

However, Myanmar's shadow NUG Government announced on May 5, 2021, to protect its supporters and to attacks the military dictatorship that seized power in February. In this statement, it said the move was a prelude to the establishment of a Federal Union Army and that it had the responsibility to "make effective reforms in the security sector in order to terminate the 70 year-long civil war." The purpose of the NUG is to restore democracy. It aims to compete with the military for international recognition with the ultimate goal of removing the military from Myanmar politics and building a "federal democratic union." The NUG statement described the PDF as a precursor to the Federal Union Army, which pioneered the Federal Union Army, which was trying to join forces with ethnic armed insurgent groups to fight the Army.

However, the PDF has a long way to go before it can succeed in establishing a federal Union Army or raising the level of coordination needed to threaten the military on the battlefield. Five months ago, the NUG and most of the ethnic armed groups had common opposition to the military and its recent coup, but it was not clear how much they differed from their positive intentions. In particular, the Arakan Army (AA) in western Myanmar still lacks trust in the NUG and the previous NLD government. Therefore, integrating these groups into something to approach the common good will involve a lengthy negotiation process. In addition, the economy slumped and the humanitarian crisis worsened because coronavirus infections soared, dominating the health care system. Myanmar's future is uncertain, but there are still many challenges, even in an awkward division of power between an unpopular military and a well-known elected government.

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