

Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria and her neighboring countries: the Boko Haram Experience

Kenechukwu Martha Mordi

(Department of History and International Studies, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria)

Abstract: *The U.S State department defined terrorism as “the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against a noncombatant targets by sub-national groups”. It went further to define terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments in the pursuit of goals that are political, religious or ideological. In light of this, the expansion of Boko Haram insurgency beyond the Nigeria boundary to include its neighbors, has now left Nigeria, and other West African countries and the international community to tackle such actions of Boko Haram, seeing to it that it is not just an internal problem for Nigeria but also a global crisis which requires all necessary support to ensuring lasting peace in Nigeria. Therefore, making use of the historical method of discuss and analysis, the paper adopted a qualitative research methodology approach. The paper concluded that the future security of Nigeria and the sub-region lies in consensual, well coordinated, well-structured and well-resourced interventions by national and regional forces. But more than that, the overall success in resolving the Boko Haram threat calls for sustained measures aimed at intricately addressing the social, economic and political issues that galvanized terrorist radicalization that gave Boko Haram a foot hold in Nigeria.*

Keywords: Terrorism, Violence, Radicalization, Security, Boko Haram, J-Curve theory

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2002, Mohammad Yusuf formed Boko Haram as a Sunni Islamist sect to oppose Western education and establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. However, this group has carried out numerous attacks since 2009, including the 2011 bombing of the U.N headquarter in Abuja, but the sect is best known for its adoption of the 2014 Chibok school girls kidnapping. Today Nigeria is seriously faced with daunting challenges to political stability caused as a result of terrorism and insurgency. The issue of Boko Haram has been an awful situation facing the Nigeria government and its citizens for years now without proper solution. Boko Haram, meaning Western Education is forbidden, an Islamist militant group based in Northeastern Nigeria, has been carrying out numerous aimed attacks on civilian population for years now, and these attacks such as abductions and killing of people, destruction of schools, health care centers, churches, mosques by this terrorist sect has plunged Nigeria into a state of security dilemma.

The Boko Haram insurgency poses a threat to national security, however, it should be noted that the concept of national security, in the post-Cold War era, has gone beyond securing lives and properties of the people through the protection of territorial integrity of the state against threats of external aggressors. Since July 2009 Boko Haram engaged the Nigerian security forces, the terrorist group have grown to become a serious national, regional and international concern. Boko Haram, an Islamic sect like other terrorist group driven by religion, seeks to destroy the Nigerian government and establish their own law in Nigeria. Nigeria a state once respected for its intervening role in conflict of other fellow African states have now been found in a situation of needed assistance from international community to ensure peace in her state.

The activities of Boko Haram became intensified in August 2011 with the bombing of the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja leaving about twenty three dead. In March, 2015, the terrorist group pledged allegiance to the Islamic state of Iraq, including ISIS and Al-Qaeda, a bold step many were unexpecting. Therefore, with the wide range of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, this project concludes that Boko Haram insurgency has posed a serious challenge to Nigeria, with regards to issues of National security, education and serious economic impact that has continued to threaten the core existence of Nigeria and its relations with her neighbor.

The activities of Boko Haram became intensified in August 2011 with the bombing of the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja leaving about twenty three dead. In March, 2015, the terrorist group pledged allegiance to the Islamic state of Iraq, including ISIS and Al-Qaeda, a bold step many were not expecting. Therefore, with the wide range of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, this project concludes that Boko Haram insurgency has posed a serious challenge to Nigeria, with regards to issues of National security, education and serious economic impact that has continued to threaten the core existence of Nigeria and its relations with her neighbor.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research work is based on the J-Curve theory of analysis, because different theories have been advanced to explain revolutions and rebellions in every part of the world including Africa. Some of these theories see insurgency as following a natural history in that the insurgency is typically a culmination of a series of qualitatively unique developmental stages. As a result of more relevance to this topic, however, is Davies' (1962) J-Curve of revolution. Although Davies unlike Britton did not present a scheme, he argues that a set of qualitative developmental changes leads to revolutionary outbreaks and that the full realization of all of these changes is necessary before a revolution or insurgency can take place. The core hint of his theory is that revolutions or insurgencies are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of economic or social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. He finds evidence for this pattern in three successful revolutions: 1) Dorr's revolution in early nineteenth century Rhode Island, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, and the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. It is this pattern that he calls the "J-curve" of need-satisfaction where the progressive period of increasing satisfaction represents the shaft of the J and the sharp downturn represents its 12 crook. Using the J-curve, discussing the Boko Haram uprising as deriving the long upward slope of the J-curve from the nearly six decades of sustained political success of the Hausa-Fulani elite within the Nigerian federation, on which the entire northern population depended.

The political power that it wielded masked the economic and social stagnation of the region and the debilitating poverty of the majority of the northern population. But the final "sharp reversal" precipitating the insurgency is the loss of the presidency to the West in 1999, which exposed the utterly miserable economic and social conditions of the north. This "awakening" heightened fears of southern (or Western) cultural domination and produced what Mazrui as quoted in Aigbe calls "spiritual and identitarian" quest in Islam, which gave immense signification to the Boko Haram sect.

The J-curve theory, despite its applicability to the formation of the Boko Haram insurgency, has limited utility for discussing the emergence of several factions from Boko Haram, with each pursuing an agenda that initially appeared to be fundamentally different from and oppositional to the objectives of Boko Haram.

Therefore, according to Aigbe, (2014) despite criticisms of Davies J-curve including that it posits a single state of mind for all members of the coalition, the idea of a J-curve in terms of the Boko Haram uprising is appealing and has explanatory power, at least, in terms of the formation of the Boko Haram insurgency.

III. THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF BOKO HARAM

Relative Deprivation Theory

To John (2021), the development of the concept of relative deprivation theory from Stouffer to Runciman was therefore towards its specification in intergroup terms as a social comparison process that can instigate individual and group behavior. Referring to Fahey (2010), asserts that the term, relative deprivation was first used in a series of social-psychological studies of the American armed forces, published in 1949 under the title, *The American Soldier*. This work, Fahey continues was based on a large body of research carried out by the US War Department between 1941 and 1945, on factors affecting motivation and morale among troops in the US army. The concept of relative deprivation was thus developed to explain how dissatisfaction among troops did not always arise directly from the objective hardships they suffered but varied according to how they framed their assessments of their own situation. According to Walker & Pettigrew (1984), the initial concept of the relative deprivation theory is simple: persons may feel deprived of some desirable thing relative to their own past, another person, persons, group, ideal, or some other social category.

Relative deprivation offers the opportunity of understanding the driving force behind youth involvement in the Boko Haram conflict in the Northeast part of Nigeria. In this sense, insurgency is framed as not just a response to the challenges of the socio-political system in Nigeria but relative (comparative) marginalization and exclusion foisted on young people and commoners from this zone. Anchored on classical functionalist perspective, relative deprivation sees deprivation as facilitating social action in the event where one or a group perceives its benefit, vis-à-vis its contribution and in relationship to the significant other as inadequate. According to Solomon A. Adedire, Modupe Ake and Olakunle Olowojolu (2016), Relative deprivation theory holds that “feelings of deprivation and frustration underline individual decisions to engage in collective action”.⁴ Relative deprivation theory is attributed to a sociologist, Samuel A. Stouffer. In the words of Turner (1990), Stouffer’s work on relative deprivation theory is representative of the shift in sociology from a focus on social reform to theory. Turner added that sociologists use relative deprivation theory to explain the origins of social movements. Social movements refer to a deliberate voluntary effort to organize individuals who act in concert to achieve group influence and make or block changes. The central idea of relative deprivation theory suggests that individuals or groups feel deprived when their current circumstances are negatively compared to the situation of others. In sociology, relative deprivation theory is a view of social change and movements according to which people take action for social change in order to acquire something (for example, opportunities, status and wealth) that others possess and which they believe they should have, too. This condition can engender political violence like we have witness in the case of Boko Haram. One observation that must be made about relative deprivation theory is that it has become a popular theory among experts. However, scholars have questioned the link between relative deprivation and social movements. According to Morrison (1971), much of evidence linking social movements to feelings of relative deprivation is indirect. While absolute deprivation clearly leads to feelings of discontent and ultimately efforts to effect social change, feelings of relative deprivation may or may not definitely lead to creation of social movement and collective identity.

According to (Richardson, 2011), nevertheless, the concept of relative deprivation has also been traced back to ancient Greece where Aristotle articulated the idea that revolution is driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure. He went further to posit that for Aristotle, the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have, i.e. a discrepancy in both instances between what people have of political and economic goods relative to what they think is justly theirs. According to Chris Granville (2021), he suggests that, the policy makers should have anticipated that the rise of Boko Haram in Borno could be an attraction for those who feel deprived as a result of systemic corruption in government leading to a conflict. Conflict is a pervasive element which can occur at any time between individuals, groups, organizations or nations. Several perspectives on conflict have been advanced but mainly, Conflict theories focus on negative, conflicted and ever-changing nature of society. Originating primarily out of Karl Max’s writings on class struggles but with roots also in the writings of Sigmund Freud, Adam Smith, Machiavelli, Max Weber, and Clausewitz, modern conflict theories such as the relative deprivation theory finds social conflict

between any groups in which the potential for inequality exists for instance racial, gender, religious, political, economic, among others.

To Daniel Agbiboa (2013), the meaning of relative deprivation can be gleaned from the works of its finest exponents Ted Gurr (1970), 'In his book' *Why Men Rebel*, arguing that people become dissatisfied if they feel they have less than they should and could have. Over time, such dissatisfaction leads to frustration and then rebellion against the (real or perceived) source of their deprivation. Boko Haram, a radical Islamist group from Northeastern Nigeria has caused so much severe destruction in the country since 2009, to the extent that the former Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan opined that the threat posed by the extremist group was worse than that of Nigeria's civil war in the 1960s. Bombings and shootings by the group had targeted Nigeria's religious and ethnic fault lines in an apparently escalating bid to hurt the nation's stability (Agbiboa, 2013). In the study of Agbiboa the history and tendencies of the Boko Haram insurgency in the country was indeed profoundly interrogated. And it was additionally seen in the context of relative deprivation. According to Aderopo (2013), the approach to understanding the roots of violence has its largest group of proponents from among scholars (e.g. Midlarsky, 1975, Forest, 2012, Kabir-Isa, 2011, Mahmud et al, 2009, Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate Jr, 1990 among others). Most of these scholars are sociologists and development studies experts, including economists. They argue that government must attend to socio-economic deprivation, which is most pervasive in the north creating higher levels of poverty and inequality. From this standpoint, the bloodshed is attributed to failure to meet the human needs of social actors. Its fundamental hypothesis is that all humans have basic needs, and failure to achieve it can lead to violent conflict being seen as a way to survive. According to Schaefer (2008), relative deprivation is "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities".¹¹ Walker (2012), argued that an individual or a group of people may feel deprived if there is a perception of denial of their legitimate rights and benefits. This may lead to a feeling of discontent among the affected individuals when they come to the realization that their prevailing circumstance is worse than anticipated relative to those of other groups or persons around them. Most Nigerians strongly argued that they are consciously, systematically, and strategically deprived, with their economic, social, and political rights denied and violated by the State and Central Governments. This was evident in the Boko Haram declaration that Western education is forbidden which announced the advent of the conflict.

There is of course no gainsaying the fact that socio-economic conditions in the Northeast of Nigeria have worsened over time and the structure of opportunity seems non-existent and grossly stifling of youth aspirations. However, the explanatory power of the theory in the context of Boko Haram is undermined by the fact that it fails to explain why relative deprivation does not generate social action in all groups. In other words, why is it that there is a greater number of young people who even though similarly affected by the extant socio-political and economic situations in the Northeast have not taken to insurgency than those who have taken the path of Boko Haram. In this sense, the theory hardly poses a direct relationship between deprivation and socio-political consciousness. In fact, while the relative deprivation theory may serve well in the articulation of ethno-national grievance, it seems too tenuous an explanation of an extremely radical social action as insurgency which can neither be generalized for a given social group nor seen as commonly shared attributes of mainstream believers in the religion.

Political Ideology

Since Shekau's assumption of the leadership of Boko Haram, there have been two main overlapping strands of Boko Haram ideology. The first is the desire to launch a 'revenge mission' against the Nigerian government and Islamic leaders in northern Nigeria who supported both former Nigerian President Yar'Adua's crackdown on Boko Haram and the killing of Yusuf in July 2009, and President Jonathan's ascent to the presidency in 2010 after Yar'Adua died of natural causes. This strand has been adopted by every faction deriving from Yusuf's original followers, including the Yusuiya Islamic Movement (YIM) which broke from Shekau because of Boko Haram's 'false holy war' and 'bombings targeted against civilians'.¹⁴ The second ideological strand is focused on regional and international jihadist goals. Both Shekau's faction, whose members are largely drawn from Yusuf's

original followers, and the splinter group Ansaru whose leadership, having been trained by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), broke away from Shekau in January 2012 have carried out operations to further these goals. Ansaru in particular has translated international and pan-West African rhetoric into militant activity, with a focus on the kidnapping of foreigners. For example, Ansaru kidnapped and killed a British and an Italian engineer in Birnin Kebbi in May 2011, and a German engineer in Kano in March 2012 (while AQIM claimed responsibility, the operation was organized by Ansaru); kidnapped a French engineer in Katsina in December 2012, whose whereabouts remain unknown; and kidnapped and killed seven foreign engineers in Bauchi in February 2013. After kidnapping the French engineer in Katsina, Ansaru claimed that the attack was in response to France's plans to militarily intervene in a 'war on Islam' in Mali and its prohibition on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf by women in public places. Similarly, after Ansaru killed three Nigerians in an attack on a bus convoy of troops preparing to deploy to Mali, it said the attack was in response to European countries' 'transgressions in Afghanistan and Mali'. This transnational messaging has become the public hallmark of Ansaru's ideology to date.¹⁵

Boko Haram which translates into "western education is forbidden" has an ideology that is based on a fundamentalist Sunni Islam, and their intent is to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria and cleanse the country of any and all Western influence. In an effort to concretize Islamic state in Nigeria, Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for series of bombing, massacres, shooting, abduction and kidnapping in different parts of the country. Boko Haram, meanwhile, whilst still maintaining a primarily domestic ideology, has also become more international in its operations, particularly since 2010. For example, it has issued statements warning the United States that 'jihad has begun' and claimed responsibility for the suicide vehicle bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja in August 2011. The author went further to posit that, the failure to dig deeper into the incubation of Boko Haram has obscured the fact that ideological radicalization has been an ongoing process in Nigeria, intensified by the 1979 Iranian revolution, the implementation of Sharia Law in twelve northern states since 1999, and the 9/11 attacks in the US. Before Yusuf and Shekau emerged as leaders of Boko Haram, Nigeria's northern states – especially the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Bauchi were ideologically fertile for exploitation. Since Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, for example, northern Nigeria's Shia population has been led by the radical Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, who has modeled the Nigerian Shia movement called the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) on Hizbullah and, with Iranian financial support, has overseen the increase in Nigeria's Shia population from less than 1 per cent of the country's Muslim population in 1979 to around 5 to 10 percent in 2013.

According to Walker (2012), Boko Haram believes that corrupt Muslims are at the helm of affairs in northern Nigeria. It seeks to engage in a war with northern political elites and the entire country so as to establish an Islamic state ruled by the Sharia legal system. Boko Haram also demands that government institutions, including the military, police and other paramilitary agencies be replaced by a new Islamic structure. The group abhors Western culture and aims to eradicate all Western influences in Nigeria. By Western culture, it means modern science, education, religion and democracy; and also according to Adole (2015), the practice of raising males and females in the same house is also rejected and the group refutes the evolutionary theory of human existence (the originations of man from apes) and the assertion that the sun is stationary. He went further to posit that, Yusuf believed that rain comes directly from God and did not accept that it is due to evaporation. He abhorred state's institutions, attacked cultural norms, rejected the Nigerian Constitution and flag and subscribed to radical Islam, which does not accept freedom of religion, democracy and anything that originates from the West. Thus, Yusuf succeeded to mobilize his followers to subscribe to his ideological standpoint. He submitted that "the rejection of Western education and Westernization were the twin pillars which defined the movement".

Religion and Violence

According to Lang Michael, there is a consensus in the available literature that all religions have within the practices ensuing from their foundational beliefs both violent and peaceful tendencies. In well-established global religions such as Christianity and Islam, there exist ideologies and doctrines that are so diverse and complex that justification for both violence and peace can be found within their traditions. As such, virtually all religions have

at different times and places been associated either with conflict or peace. In *Terror in the Mind of God*, Lang argues that all global religions have had a violent perspective. Clearly, therefore, religion, violence, and peace have been companions throughout human history. However, for some time now, militant Islamism in the hands of minority extremists in the name of Islam has grown, with no continent left untouched. This Islamic militancy, as should be expected, has left the affected people (Muslims and non-Muslims) shocked, angry, and uncomprehending. As Lang notes, Islamic terrorism builds on the fact that Islam emphasizes action given that Muslims are enjoined “to struggle (jihad) to implement their belief, to lead a good life, to defend religion, to contribute to the development of a just Islamic society throughout the world”. In this present context of Muslim extremism and ensuing terrorism, the word jihad is used by terrorist movements such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Islamic State, and the like to legitimize their causes and motivate their followers.

Agbiboa has argued that “conflict seems to be a hallmark of African societies.” Indeed, various forms of violent conflict have engulfed Africa, exacting a heavy toll on the continent's human and natural resources. He went on to state that following Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999, 12 northern states introduced the Sharia legal system, setting the stage for the flourishing of pro-Islamic and anti-Western groups in the country, such as the Boko Haram sect. It is widely believed that Boko Haram originated in Borno state in 2002, under the leadership of Sheik Mohammed Yusuf. The sect's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, meaning “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.” However, it is by the term Boko Haram—meaning Western education/civilization is sacrilegious—that the sect is popularly known. The philosophy of Boko Haram is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam religion.

According to Abogunrin, (1984) politics and religion in Nigeria are viewed as “two inseparable institutions in the human social psyche and structure.” Arguing from the Muslim perspective contends that “Islam is a way of life, which dictates the political ideology and practice in any Islamic society.” He equally asserts that “earthly governments are mere agents of God's theocratic governance of the physical and spiritual world²². According to Agbiboa, (2013) the inseparable link between religion and social life creates deep suspicion when it is perceived that one religious group is dominating the political affairs of the country. Members of different religious groups want their religion to dominate the affairs of the country. The struggle for ascendancy and control puts Christianity and Islam at dagger-drawn opposition one that has marked the history of Nigeria since independence.

The nexus between Maitatsine and Boko Haram Class Struggle

According to Aborishade and Mundt, (2002), an Islamic Scholar, Marwa, who migrated from a town called Marwa in Northern Cameroon to Kano in 1945, established and led this movement. He was imprisoned, and subsequently deported to Cameroon in 1962, as a result of his vitriolic preaching and hatred of those in authority. In 1966, he returned to Nigeria and was again arrested and detained between 1972 and 1975. The fact alone that Marwa was able to return to Nigeria after his deportation shows to the porosity of Nigeria's borders due to poor implementation of immigration policies and the weaknesses of the security personnel at border posts. This situation has been exploited by Boko Haram for arms transfer, recruitment of foreign members, and links with foreign supporters. According to Olumuyiwa Faluyi Sultan Khan & Adeoye Akinola “Boko Haram membership is drawn from neighboring countries like Chad and Niger. Marwa's epithet is Maitatsine that is derived from the words Mai, interpreted as possessor while maitatsine signifies ‘he curses’²⁵. According to the author, Marwa was known for unleashing curses on cigarette smokers and those who ride bicycles. Devotees mainly consist of Ulamas/Almajiris, who are students/followers of the mallams (Islamic or Quranic teachers). Maitatsine attracted a mass following because the decline in economic conditions produced a legion of Almajiris with no steady source of income. The unemployed formed the bulk of his adherents.

The Maitatsine movement was greatly aided by the Almajirisystem, whereby parents entrust their sons to an Islamic teacher, who often takes them far from their homes like it is witness today in the case of Boko Haram. The Devastation experienced in the Maitatsine uprising cannot be overestimated. Its first major religious violence in Kano took place between December 18 and 29, 1980. It was triggered off by members of the Maitatsine sect. In this attack, Maitatsine unleashed a three-day riot in which 4,200 people were killed, mostly

Muslims. The purpose as claimed by the group was to reform Muslim worship and to cleanse Islam from its many non-Muslim accretions. Yusuf made his heresy and inciting utterances by preaching against Western education and consistently argued that the current system in Nigeria symbolized by government, needed to be overthrown and replaced with an extreme version of Islamic law. Just like Maitatsine as discussed earlier, Yusuf was also hostile to other Muslims who disagreed with his methods and beliefs. Both movements were against western education as it went against their belief system.

According to Both the Maitatsine and the Boko Haram uprisings have things in common. Fundamentally, both were fanatical Islamic sects, whose basic beliefs differed from those held by the majority conservative Muslims in Nigeria. Both levied war on the Nigerian state, the intensity of which almost compromised her security. In both instances, the persistence of the aggression, despite the police involvement in quelling it, led to the deployment of the national army and air force to suppress it. Obviously evidence of its elaborate planning and organizations, their persistence and spread cast them in the mold of insurrectionists. The Maitatsine uprisings persisted for five years in five states: Kano, Kaduna, Borno, old Gongola, and Bauchi; the Boko Haram riots spread across Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno over a five day period. The number of lives lost in the uprisings is further evidence of their intensity. In philosophy and objectives, both sects were similar in rejecting Western civilization and its products, and the enforcement of strict Islam. Their acknowledgement of the use of violence could have informed the stubbornness and general lawlessness of members. This accounted for their brush with the law at different times, yet it did not mellow them: rather, they were emboldened to become more lawless. The deportation of Muhammadu Marwa from Kano in the 1960s and his imprisonment in 1973 hardened him the same way that the regular detention of Mohammed Yusuf did not deter him.²⁷ Nura Sani in his comparison of both groups, tried to make a comparison between the two groups in terms of their militancy, weaponry and other aspects, he established that Maitatsine was a localized religious movement with no inspirational and ideological ties to foreign groups. Boko Haram, on the other hand, derives inspiration and ideological nourishment from global jihadist groups like Al-Qaida and ISIS and models itself after the Afghan Taliban and ISIS. He further maintained that Maitatsine was a largely urban movement and their residential areas (such as Yan Awaki in Kano, Bulunkutu in Maiduguri, etc) could easily be identified and attacked. Conversely, Boko Haram is largely a rural insurgency, although it has a presence in both rural and urban areas. This makes the task of identifying and crushing its fighters and infrastructures more complicated. Maitatsine's followers fought with bows and arrows and perhaps a few locally made guns. These were no match for the firearms of the Nigerian security services. Boko Haram on the other hand boasts of an arsenal of weapons that is as deadly if not more deadly and modern than that of the Nigerian armed forces. Maitatsine was numerically much smaller than Boko Haram. Maitatsine's presence was confined to four urban areas, Kano, Maiduguri, Yola, and Gombe. Boko Haram is everywhere in the entire Northeast and Northwest zones of the country and has staged attacks all over those areas and even in Abuja, the capital of the country, and Lagos in the south west of the country. Maitatsine had no capacity for bomb making; Boko Haram does.

There is an element of truth in what he posits as in some aspect Maitatsine and Boko Haram are different but given their perspectives and approach to the application of strict Islam, though with some coloration, both the Maitatsine and the Boko Haram movements are broadly defined as fundamentalist groups. Viewed from a cognitive perspective, fundamentalism expresses exclusivity, particularity, literality, and moral rigor. Viewed from a cultural theological framework, it expresses opposition to religious and cultural liberalism in defense of orthodoxy and religious traditions. From a social movement perspective, it represents organizational and ideological uniqueness, in regard to other types of religious movements. It stresses the authority of scripture and the necessity of righteous living, and places emphasis on right doctrine and the necessity of organized warfare against the forces of modernism.

The Nigerian border appears to be the most vulnerable spot and the nation's "arc hillsheel" to Nigeria's self-complacent attitude toward her security, based on the false premise that Nigeria is bordered by smaller and relatively weaker but friendly states which do not constitute any real threat to Nigeria's national security.

With regards to border porosity, Fawole shows how civil war served the main purpose of exposing Nigeria's security underbelly through its immediate neighbours. The first came about with France's intention to use Benin Republic for running guns and supplies to Biafra under the guise of humanitarian assistance which caused Nigeria to rethink and refocus its national security to include its neighbours. Thus, it can be discerned that border porosity of Nigeria with its neighbours is not a new phenomenon in aggravating criminal activities in the Sahel region which Boko Haram activity has benefited from.

Albert also shows how border porosity aids Boko Haram in drawing members from Nigeria's neighbours. He contends further that many of the Boko Haram members arrested by the Nigerian Armed Forces are from Chad, Niger and Cameroon³. A prisoner presented by the Nigerian military as a fighter for the Boko Haram terrorist networks, exonerates Herbert's claim by saying that extremists from neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroon fight in the Islamic uprising in the country's northeast. His account confirms reports from survivors of attacks and reinforces fears that what once was a machete-wielding-gang now poses a serious threat to Nigeria's security and may be forming alliances with other radical groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

Anthony Asiwaju also reveals how Boko Haram exploits Nigeria's porous borders with its neighbours to carry out its activities arguing that, border crime and terrorism-border partnership have become a major event in Africa manifested in the widespread identification of borders and borderlands in the continent as notoriously 'porous', 'ungoverned' and 'ungovernable' locations and spaces. The problem is underscored in the literature on 'failed states', failed on account of, among other critical factors, the deplorable inability to exercise effective control on the entirety of claimed territory, notably at the adjoining borders and border areas of the national peripheries. He gives an instance of the Hutu-Tutsi genocidal confrontations in Rwanda in the mid-1990s and the cross-border spill-over into Burundi and the inaccessible Eastern DRC that now provides a safe haven for the M23 Forces, fighting Government and UN-support forces, to say nothing about the more recent about and still raging blood-letting across the ethno-religious boundary between Muslim and Christian communities within the borders of the Central African Republic, with cross-border spill-over, especially in massive outflow of refugees into neighbouring Cameroon. Thus, Boko Haram insurgency has become a cross-border phenomenon with a long and deep historical root which Boko Haram has profited from a characteristically poorly infrastructure and hardly "ungoverned", if not totally "ungovernable", African Cross-Border Areas in the literally endless wilderness in the historic Lake Chad Basin.

Nigeria's Relation with Chad

Nigeria and Chad both obtained their political independence from their respective colonial masters in 1960 and have since been exchanging diplomatic missions and entering into various bilateral relations that border on trade, culture, education, industry, and religion with a view to promoting their mutual national interests which are central to international relations. These were not achieved without many challenges. No relationship between two countries is complete without strains or possibilities of conflicts and misunderstandings. Strains are bound to occur whether on a minor scale requiring diplomatic efforts to resolve them or on a grand scale leading to a military confrontation. Chad, of all Nigeria's immediate neighbors, posed the most serious challenges to Nigeria's security issues.

Since early 2015, attacks in Chad by the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram have killed hundreds, displaced more than 100,000 and damaged the regional economy of the Lake Chad basin⁷. Boko Haram has taken advantage of the geography of the lake seeking refuge on its many islands. The cultural and religious influence of Nigeria's Borno state facilitated the penetration of the Borno-born jihadist group, which has also taken advantage of longstanding communal tensions in the area.

According to Decalo, Nigeria's relations with Chad have been severely affected by the Chadian crisis and the activities of Boko Haram. The internationalization of the Chadian civil war and the level of arms transfer have distorted the military balance in the sub-region. The social and political problems have resulted in activities that have grossly affected bilateral relations⁸. The border with Chad was the only one over which Nigeria had to take

a major military operation in reaction to frequent Chadian armed incursions into the Nigerian state. The porous nature of borders in a region that has long been in Nigeria's orbit facilitated the extension of the Boko Haram threat to the Chadian shores of the lake⁹. In fact, Decalo further stressed that the security forces in the area had to maintain a high level of operational readiness because of reports of incursions into the Nigerian territory by armed Chadian groups as well as complaints of intimidation from villagers in Borno state by Chadian gendarmes.

In cultural terms, the lake forms part of what used to be the Kanem-Bornou Empire and the political organisation, language and customs of the Kanembu in Chad are very similar to those of the Nigerian Kanuri. The Chadian lakeshores and islands' economy is heavily oriented toward Maiduguri the epicenter of Boko Haram in Nigeria; the city serves as both a commercial hub and a religious and cultural centre for many Chadian migrants.

The Chadian armed incursions into the border with Nigeria became so ripe while lots of lives and properties were lost to the criminal activities of the book haram. Before this day, during the Obasanjo administration, the security concern generated a high level of military alert to the extent that the government of President Obasanjo had to give orders to the military and police to patrol the Northern highways with the recently acquired helicopters gunships (the MI 35) in order to adequately check the banditry incursion into Nigeria.

For many years, inhabitants on the Chadian shore of the lake have looked more to Maiduguri than to N'Djamena. Islanders use the Naira, Nigeria's currency. Many Buduma, Kouri and Kanembu have a limited sense of national identity – and only express it on rare occasions. They are used to moving across the border freely, in response to climate hazards or economic opportunities and they often possess identity documents from several lakeshore states. For many young Chadians in the region, the journey to Nigeria is crucial to build up savings and a marriage dowry. Numerous Chadian Buduma have worked as cattle herders on the Nigerian side of the lake, earning money to buy their own animals before returning home to get married.

Climatic and economic migration reached peak levels during the great droughts of the 1970s. In search of grazing land, many Chadian pastoralists crossed the lake's northern basin to reach the Nigeria-Niger borderlands. In this same period, some Buduma fishermen settled for several months of the year in BagaKawa on the Nigerian shore to fish and sell their catches, adapting to fluctuations in water levels. And many Kanembu from the Chadian shore sought work in the ports or landing points began in Kanembu or Kanuri in Nigeria: BagaKawa, Malam-Fatori and Woulgo. The clashes between Boko Haram and the region's armies have caused serious damage to these ports, and strain in the relations of both countries.

The most persistent threat to Nigeria's national security interest was the frequent border clashes with Chad and the continuous infiltration of armed bandits allegedly from Chad, foreign military troops close to Nigerian border and crisis among various warring factions and government forces in Chad. It was as a result of this that the Nigerian border with Chad was closed temporarily during Buhari's administration. The closure of the border reminded Chad of mutuality of their dependence. Chad was denied its only access to the sea and to petroleum imports, which were vital to the war efforts, while Nigeria was denied cattle imports from Chad which was also important to the Nigerian consumer market.

Religious education has also been a factor behind the migration of many young Chadians to Borno state. For many years, Chadian children and young men have gone to study in Maiduguri, the cultural and religious centre of the region. This trend has been particularly marked among the communities that live on the shores or islands of Lake Chad. The population explosion that got underway in the 1970s in the Lake region and the absence of government policies to deal with the impact of this demographic growth fuelled the pace of departures to Nigeria. While the vast majority of children who left to study in Borno returned to Chad without incident, some were exposed to the preaching of ulema close to Boko Haram, either within or outside Quran schools.

There is the need for both countries to address these problems most especially the security challenges that tried to hamper their relations. The issue of repatriation of Chadians in 1980 by Shagari's administration, this repatriation strained the relations of the two countries. Shouldering of the financial burden by Nigeria during the reconciliation efforts between government forces and the Boko Haram insurgency is equally another that has caused some strains in their relations. Hence, such issues should be addressed to promote cordial relations.

Nigeria's Relation with Niger Republic

Niger, located at the heart of an area subject to intense geopolitical turbulence, remains a weak link in the Sahel. The March 2016 re-election of President Issoufou provided some political stability but the country has yet to deal with the immense economic and demographic challenges it faces. Pointing to the cross-border threats from Mali, Libya and Nigeria, the government has focused on security rather than the *Renaissance* socio-economic plan put forward by President Issoufou when he was first elected in 2011.

For the last two years, Niger has been waging open war against Boko Haram, a jihadist insurrection founded in north-eastern Nigeria that has spread to neighboring countries. The government has mobilized the armed forces and adopted a harsh policy aimed at depriving it of its economic resources that has curbed the movement's advance in Niger. But counter-insurgency operations have deeply disrupted the Diffa region, located in the south east, where the conflict is raging. Boko Haram is certainly on the back foot in Niger but that does not mean it has been defeated. In any case, this insurrection, joined by hundreds of people, has generated a conflict that will leave a lasting mark on the country's south east.

Another persistent threat to Nigeria's national security interest was the frequent border clashes with Niger and the continuous infiltration of Boko Haram members into the Northern region allegedly from Borno, foreign military troops close to Nigerian border and crisis among various warring factions and government forces in Niger. It was as a result of this that the Nigerian border with Niger was closed temporarily during Buhari's administration. The rise of Boko Haram in the region has found its way into Niger and it is believed by the Nigerian government there is a free movement that these insurgent groups possess into Nigeria due to its porous border.

IV. CONCLUSION

The combat against terrorism is not a battle to be won exclusively with guns and bombs. Boko Haram is partly driven by ideology, and wars over ideas are hardly destroyed through the use of war arsenals. The dialogue option is considered counterintuitive to some policy-makers, who are apprehensive of creating the impression of state weakness or attending to unreasonable and outlandish demands of terrorist group. No doubt that such impression maybe alive among some critical opinion moulders in multi-ethnic configurations like Nigeria, but willingness to dialogue shows a government that prioritise human security. There are several flawed attempts at dialogue with Boko Haram, especially in 2011. The failure of past dialogues was not because the idea of dialogue is wrong, but because the execution was flawed. There was a lack of political will, an absence of discretion, leaking of information and limited cohesion in the expectations of the process and its outcomes. If negotiation and dialogue instruments were deployed to release some Chibok and Dapachi school girls, then government should not be put off by previous failure of dialogue with Boko Haram leaders.

Given the fact that quite a good number of young people marginal to the socio-economic spheres of the society are found in Boko Haram and that the Northeast emerges one of the worst zones in all critical social indicators in Nigeria, the relative deprivation theory easily emerges a good explanatory framework of the Boko Haram activities. The scourge of Boko Haram insurgency on the people of Northeastern Nigeria, and especially those of Borno State is quite burdensome. It is widely acknowledged that terrorist activities have dealt (and are still dealing) heavy blows on the people consistently exposed to Boko Haram violent attacks, causing deaths, economic deprivations, social and political subjugation and physical/mental limitations all of which result in dehumanization of the victims of Boko Haram insurgency. As victims of terrorism battle to survive and readjust their lives to realities engendered by their exposure to Boko Haram violence in Borno state, it is important to see

the depth of the impact of these violent attacks on the economic, social and political dimensions of the victims' lifestyles.

However, despite a plethora of literature on Boko Haram, and its impact on different aspects of Nigerian economy, politics, culture, and social interactions, there was nothing on how the economic, political and social dimensions of lifestyles of people of Borno state, who experience the largest exposures to Boko Haram violent and deadly attacks on regular basis have been impacted. Neither was there anything on the sufficiency and adequacy of victim relief and support system. This was unexpected given the critical position of Borno state as the epicenter of Boko Haram's operations in Nigeria and the crippling of the state's economic and socio-political systems and infrastructures.

While the pace of Boko Haram's attacks has decreased, it has not halted. Indeed, Mass kidnappings and multiple bombing of populated areas continue. This requires the government to be aware of its responsibility to put an end to the Boko Haram siege. Given allegations that President Buhari's government has deliberately relaxed its counter terrorism efforts, the government's top priority should be the complete dismantling of the apparatus of Boko Haram and the eradication of its structures. Apart from deploying hard power, the government should also seek to fully understand the factors responsible for the evolution of Boko Haram's extremism into a terrorist organization that threatens the corporate existence of Nigeria. This should be the starting point for the complete eradication of Boko Haram's terrorism. Similar approach should be deployed against other forms of insurgency in the country.

REFERENCES

TEXTBOOKS

- [1.] A. Asiwaju, Terrorism and African Border Governance in Sturies, S. (Eds). *Reflections on Nigeria's Foreign Policy*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Society for International Relations Awareness, Abuja, Nigeria. (2015).
- [2.] W. A. Fawole, *Nigeria's External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule (1966-1999)*. ObafemiAwolowo University Press Ltd; Ile-Ife, Nigeria, (2003).
- [3.] Onuoha, F, Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria. In M. P. De Montclos (Ed.), *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, Los Angeles and Addis Ababa: Tsehai Pub, 2015.
- [4.] Aborishade, O and Mundt, R. *Politics in Nigeria*. Second edition, New York: Longman.

Electronic Sources

- [5.] E.E. Anugwom. "TheBoko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria: Perspective from within". pub, Palgrave MacMillan, 2019.
- [6.] J. Iyi and H. Strydom. *Boko Haram and International Law*.Epub, Springer publisher, 2018.
- [7.] F. Olumuyiwa, K. Sultan and A. Adeoye. *Boko Haram's Terrorism and the Nigeria State: Federalism, politics and policies*. Epub, Springer publisher, 2019.

Journals

- [8.] Abimbola, A. BetweenMaitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and
- [9.] Response of the Nigerian State. *Africa Today*, Vol. 57, No. 4, (2011).
- [10.] Adefuge, A. Nigeria and Chad: Seminar paper on Nigeria's immediate neighbours, *National Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (1999).
- [11.] Adesoji, A.O, Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State. *Africa Today*, Vol. 57, No. 2, (2011).

- [12.] Adole, R.A. The Role of Political Leaders in the Resolution of political violence in Yobe State, North east Region Nigeria. *Journal of Political Science and Administration*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2015).
- [13.] Agbakoba, C.N.O. The OAU forces in Chad, *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.13, No. 1, (1998).
- [14.] Agbiboa, D. No Retreat, No Surrender: Understanding the Religious Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *African Study Monographs*, Vol. 34, No. 2, (2013).
- [15.] Agbiboa, D and Benjamin, M. Nigeria United in grief; divided in response: Religious Terrorism. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 14, 1, (2014).
- [16.] Agbiboa, D. Peace at Dagger Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 37, No.1, (2014).
- [17.] Agbiboa, D. Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective. *Africa Conflict and Peace building Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (2013).
- [18.] Agbiboa, D. Boko Haram, Religious Violence and the Crisis of National Identity in Nigeria: Towards a Non-Killing Approach, *Journal of Developing Societies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (2013).
- [19.] Ahokegh, A.F, Boko Haram: A 21st Century Challenge in Nigeria. *European Scientific Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 21, (2012).
- [20.] Albert, I. O, Explaining a Security Dilemma: Nigeria-Chad relations in the Context of Boko Haram Crisis". *Ife Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.1, No. 1, (2015).
- [21.] Aloysius, O and Nnamani, E. Neoliberal economic policies and Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria. *Studies in Politics and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (2015).
- [22.] Amalu, N. Impact of Boko Haram insurgency on Human Security in Nigeria, *Global journal of Social Science*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2015).
- [23.] Atta, Barkindo et al. The ideological Evolution of Boo Haram in Nigeria, *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 158, No. 4, (2013).
- [24.] Azumah, J, Boko Haram in Retrospect. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 26, No. 1, (2015).
- [25.] Beatrice, A. Boko Haram Insurgency and the Underdevelopment of Nigeria, *Research on Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 5, No. 6, (2015).
- [26.] Brinkel, T and Ait-Hida, S, Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria. *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol. 40 No. 2, (2012).
- [27.] Chukwuma, O. Climate Change and Conflict in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Challenge. *American International Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2015).
- [28.] David, R. The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, *Terrorism studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (2013).
- [29.] Davies, J. Toward a theory of revolution, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (1962).
- [30.] Decalo, S, Chad: the roots of center-periphery strife, *African Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 317, (1999).
- [31.] Decalo, S, Regionalism, political decay and civil strife in Chad, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 18, (1989).
- [32.] Jacob, J and Akpan, I, Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria's Northeast Region. *Stability, International Journal of Security and Development*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2015).
- [33.] Michael, L. K. Christian Churches and the Boko Haram Insurgency in Cameroon: Dilemmas and Responses. *Religion*, Vol. 8, No. 8, (2018).
- [34.] Michael, G. Attacking Terrorism: "Elements of Grand Strategy" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 18, No. 4, (2006).
- [35.] Morrison, D. Some notes towards theory on relative deprivation and social movements. *The American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 14, No. 5, (1971).
- [36.] Okemi, M. E, Boko Haram: A Religious Sect or Terrorist Organization, *Global Journal of Politics and Law Research*, Vol. 1 No. 1, (2013).
- [37.] Omede, J. A, Nigeria's Relations with her Neighbours, *Kamla-Raj*, Vol.4, No.1, (2006).

- [38.] Omenma, J and Oyinshi, I. A Decade of Boko Haram activity: the attacks, responses and challenge ahead. *Security Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2020).
- [39.] Onuoha, F. C, The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained. *African Security Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2010).
- [40.] Onuoha, J and Ugwueze, M. I, United States Security Strategy and the Management of Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (2014).
- [41.] Shehuri, I.B, Muhammad, G and Abubakar, M, Challenges on Nigeria-Chad relations, *International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Literature*, Vol. 6, No. 5, (2018).
- [42.] Solomon, H, Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria. *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 157, No. 4, (2012).
- [43.] Solomon, A., Modupe, A. and Olakunle, O. "Combating Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria: An International Collaboration against Boko Haram". *Fountain University of Journal of Management and Social Science*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (2016).
- [44.] Turner, R. The many faces of American Sociology: A discipline in search of identity. *The American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 33, No. 6, (1990).
- [45.] Uchehara, K.E, Peace Talks Initiatives between the Boko Haram and Nigerian Government. *International Journal of Business and Social*, Vol. 5, No. 6, (2014).
- [46.] Umar, S. Analysis of Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria. *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, Vol. 4, No. 10, (2020).
- [47.] Usman, S. Unemployment and poverty as sources and consequences of insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram insurgency revisited. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2015).
- [48.] Walker, I and Pettigrew, T. Relative deprivation theory: An Overview and Conceptual Critique. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 23, No. 4, (1984).

Online Sources

- [49.] Abimbola, A. *Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism the Response of the Nigerian State*. 2011. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236810237>.
- [50.] Aduku, A and Benjamin, O. *Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria* (2019). Retrieved from <https://www.accord.org.za>
- [51.] Bekoe, D. *Nigeria's 2011 Elections: Best Run, but Most Violent* (2011). Retrieved from <https://www.usip.org>
- [52.] Bekoe, D. "Boko Haram" 2018. Retrieved from <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram>.
- [53.] Bob, C. *Untangling the relationship between religion and violence*. 2015. Retrieved from <https://inroadsjournal.ca>
- [54.] Captured fighter-Extremists from Chad, Niger and Cameroon fighting in Nigeria's Islamic uprising". *Fox News*, October 26, 2013. Retrieved from <https://www.foxnews.com>
- [55.] Forest, J. *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*(2012). Retrieved from https://jamesforest.com/wp-content/upload/2012/06/Boko_Haram
- [56.] Hall, J. *Religion and Violence: Social Processes in Comparative Perspective*. 2003. Retrieved from <https://wcfia.harvard.edu>
- [57.] Mapping Militant Organization. "Boko Haram" 2018. Retrieved from <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram>
- [58.] Nura, S. *Religious Violence in Nigeria: A Comparison of Boko Haram and Maitatsine Groups*. 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338711486>.
- [59.] Okunola, A. *11 Facts You Should Know About Nigeria as it Celebrate 60 years of Independence* (2020). Retrieved from [https:// www.globalcitizen.org](https://www.globalcitizen.org)

- [60.] Onuoha, F. *A Danger not to Nigeria Alone-Boko Haram's Transnational reach and Regional responses* (2014). Retrieved from <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueoros/Nigeria/11066.pdf&ved>
- [61.] Stuurman, Z. *Terrorism as Controversy: The Shifting Definition of Terrorism in State Politics* (2019). Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/09/24/terrorism-as-controversy-the-shifting-definition-of-terrorism-in-state-politics/>
- [62.] <https://www.crisisgroup.org>