

Analysis of Incidences of Corruption in the Nigerian Power Sector: Implications on Sustainable Development

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Abstract: This paper reviews corruption as an endemic menace militating against sustainable development in Nigeria from the power sector perspective. The study is aimed at exposing the negative relationship that exists between corruption and development, with the Nigerian power sector as its focal point. This research work is indeed a must read for policy makers and policy implementers if the cankerworm (Corruption) must be expelled from the Nigerian society. Information for the study was gathered using the secondary source of data collection which include; journals, textbooks and the internet. For further clarification, the Systems theory was adopted as its theoretical framework. However, the study realized and offers some primary causes liable for the sustenance of corruption which includes colonialism, prolonged military dictatorship and ethnic chauvinism. Also, the paper explores the negative impacts of corruption on the economic and the socio-political sectors of the society. Finally, the work proposes some possible solutions to counter the hazards of corruption which include; Regard for leadership Ethics, Respect for the rule of law, Transparency and accountability for leaders through availability of pre-Paid meters for all consumers, maintenance of electricity distribution channels for sufficient availability of electricity supply, enforcement of punitive measures for offenders regardless of societal status, among others.

Keywords: Corruption, Development and Power Sector

I. Introduction

One sector that has been branded very corrupt by Nigerians is the power sector. This is because of the experiences Nigerians have had with the several power supply establishments within Nigeria. Assertions of corrupt practices intensifies when Nigerians weigh the huge sums of state resources disbursed by different administrations to rehabilitate the electricity sector, however, no substantial outcome is realized at the end of the day. This failure is more prominent in the present democratic dispensation where much money is spent to provide electricity to Nigerians, yet instead of witnessing improvement, Nigerians on a daily basis have to live without adequate electricity for their socioeconomic engagements. Hence, as pointed out by Akinloye (2012), electricity production in Nigeria over the previous years has been subjected to mismanagement, fraud and maladministration, resulting instigation in electricity supply. An attempt at revamping the power sector was initiated after the end of military

incursion in 1999 with about \$16 billion which was squandered away by means of awarding fraudulent contracts, conspiracy and unavailability of systematic oversight by the overseeing ministry, and the other arms of government. By the year 2007, a fresh initiative of electricity sector reforms was introduced by late President Umaru Musa Yar'adua's administration with the aim of driving the Nigerian economy into the league of developed industrial countries by the year 2020. Upon his death in 2010, the framework was adopted by his successor, President Goodluck Jonathan, whose government began unbundling and privatizing the power utilities previously owned by the state's Power regulatory establishment (Akinloye, 2012). Unfortunately, since the Private Power Distribution Companies took over, it appears that, the only thing they are efficient at is the distribution of exorbitant electricity bills to their customers, mostly for services not rendered. The future seemed bleak for the helpless Nigerians who have continued to be exploited under this new power regime, even worse than they were when the government ran the power sector (Madukovich, 2014).

Every month, Nigerians are left with no choice but to foot exorbitant bills, which are not proportionate with the supply of electricity available at their disposal. Eboh (2014), submits that electricity supply firms in Nigeria by 2013 realized about N1.04 trillion yearly from private residences in Nigeria, N2.074 trillion per annum from Micro, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (MSMEs); N2.86 billion from the 22 federal airports operating in the country and N3.4 billion from banks and other large scale business ventures. More inquiries exposed that private residences are levied with an average of N3, 000.00 every monthly as power bill, irrespective of the fact that power is supplied or not; Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), are levied an average of N10, 000.00 every monthly; banks outlets are levied an average of about N45, 000.00 monthly, and large scale business ventures are made to pay an average of about N100, 000.00 monthly. Summing up these figures expounds that, the N3.41 trillion yearly income of electricity supply firms is about 110.5 per cent much more than the N1.62 trillion planned for capital expenses in 2013 and 43.28 per cent much more than the N2.38 trillion planned for recurrent spending. This amount however is, 31.62 per cent lower than the total 2013 budget amount of N4.987 trillion.

Notwithstanding the enormous amount of income realized by the electricity supply firms per annum, they are constantly in demand for more funds claiming that funds realized are insufficient to implement robust blue prints that could translate to sustainable constant electricity supply in Nigeria. The situation has been worsened by the current privatization of the power sector. Most Nigerians have decried the exorbitant billing system imposed by the private electricity distribution companies which are not commensurate with their level of consumption. This situation, therefore demands accountability, being that government has disbursed huge amount of funds to rehabilitate the electricity sector for the good of residents in the country, businesses; both small and large. Unfortunately, after all said and done, the power sector remains stagnant and Nigerians continue to wallow in epileptic power supply which has been a recurring decimal in every successive government for several decades. On a daily basis, a vast majority of Nigerians regardless of their financial backgrounds, spend their hard-earned money on purchasing petrol and diesel to power their generators in order to get electricity supply for their socioeconomic activities despite the huge monthly bills levied on them by the power distribution companies. This condition is erroneous and an anomaly for a country endowed with capacity to generate sufficient electricity for its consumption and also supply its neighboring countries.

II. Conceptual Framework

2.1 Corruption

Corruption as a term is derived from a particular type of Latin verb; to break, *rumpere* – which implies that something is badly broken (Tanzi, 1994). This could be ethically or morally based, or an administrative rule or a law. The perpetrator derives some recognizable benefit for him/herself, family, tribe, party, or some other relevant group (Hope and Chikulo, 2000). Transparency International (2005) refers to corruption as misappropriation of assigned authority for personal private benefit. Also, World Bank (1998) refers to corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain. The emphasis is on corruption in the public or government sector. The definition borders around the

means and manner on how public office holders manipulate their offices to amass illicit wealth for themselves at the exploitation of public interest. Government offices could also be manipulated by means of favouritism and nepotism. However, the limitation of the definition of corruption by the World Bank boils down to the fact that it narrows the scope of corruption to the public sector leaving out the private sector. There is also presence of corruption in the private sector which can also have damaging effects on the economy. Further the intensity of corruption in public offices, could have been reduced if not for the collaboration with the private sector. The level of corruption in a state is a function of degree of patriotism portrayed by officials in the public and private sectors (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Huntington (1968) intellectualizes corruption as the character of government officers which are contrary to constituted procedures aimed at personal benefits. Government contains processes and procedures by which it implements its mandate. The rapport that exists between the government and the governed in any society is clearly spelt out. However, it is a course of social contract between the government and the people (Nnoli, 2003).

2.2 Development

Coccia (2019) submits that development is a progression of unequal evolution of systems. However, development is a multi-perspective course that creates economic, technological, social and institutional transformation to sustainance prosperity of nations and an all-inclusive welfare of people in a society. Development is a very broad perception with several facets. However, some researchers associate development with economic growth. Todaro (1977) supported that development is connected with the economic and political procedures essential for influencing swift structural and institutional change of the whole society in a way that will effect more economic advancement to the widest sectors of the populace. Heidenheimer et al (1989) pointed out that development infers a social and cultural change of a particular setting. It is effected by politics, leadership, culture and corruption. The level of development of a particular society can be simply calculated or appraised by examining its population size and class structure (ibid). Largely, development is used to signify the intensification of the potential of a society, irrespective of any confines presently established by the targets or vital layout of the society (Jacobs, 1971).

2.3 Power Sector

The Power sector in Nigeria refers to the segment of the economy charged with the responsibility of electricity generation, distribution and maintenance of electrical facilities throughout the country. These activities performed by this sector are regulated by a body referred to as the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). Further, the activities of the PHCN is overseen by its parent body which is the ministry of Power, headed by a minister.

2.3 The Current State of the Power Sector

Nigeria's national grid has been plagued with challenges in the transmission and distribution subsectors, which has made it difficult to evacuate the available generation capacity through the grid. The Nigeria Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC), based on data obtained in 2021, reported that power distribution in the year, averaged 4,094.09 megawatt (MW), despite available generation capacity of about 8,000 MW². Relatedly, average unutilized power generation increased year-on-year, YoY, to 3,008.18 Megawatts, MW in 2021, from 1,030.80 MW in 2013, indicating an increase of 291 per cent in the past eight years. Efforts are ongoing to improve the state of the transmission and distribution network with several projects earmarked in the 2022 Budget. However, it is not clear when the grid, will begin to see the impact of these efforts. Due to the unbundling of the Nigerian Power Sector; it has in turn availed numerous investment opportunities which has been proven to be advantageous to investors in near longrun. These opportunities cut across the three main areas of the sector; Generation, transmission and Distribution. NDPHC has taken a giant leap towards investment in generation and a little in the other sectors

III. Theoretical Framework

In order to provide clearer analysis, the paper is anchored on the Systems theory. The theory was propounded by David Easton in 1953 who postulated that political systems are similar to living organisms. However the abstract part of the systems theory can be traced to biology of the natural sciences where a biologist Ludwig Von Bertallanty, in 1920, introduced the general systems theory (Varma, 2011).

According to Easton, the political systems is synonymous to living organisms of the natural sciences which comprises various parts which interrelate in order to sustain the system. This therefore prompted the application of systems analysis to political science. A Political system embodies connections between inputs and outputs. Inputs into the political system comprises demands and contributions of the populace. These inputs include demand for better standards of living, enhanced employment opportunities and protection of human rights. However, contributions stem from support by the public towards the smooth running of the system through payments of taxes and political participation. Outputs involve the decisions and actions of government which includes policy formulation, legislations, and imposition of taxes and allocation of public funds (Heywood, 2000). These outputs generate feedback which forms further demands and contributions. However, this cycle enables the political system to attain its objectives. It investigates the political structure of the position of its goals, its own distance from it, and the changes in this distance brought about by its own performance in response to information coming from the feedback process. Therefore, the response apparatus is expected to adjust to inputs (Gaupa, 2011). The systems theory, however, offers intuition into the functions of stakeholders in the regulation of the flow of inputs in the political system which are the pressure groups and political parties. These stakeholders would only permit legitimate demands into the political system. However, cultural mechanism can shoulder the responsibility of permitting only demands that enjoy social approval. If the stress attains critical level, then, a radical change in the system is unavoidable.

From the afore discussed, it is therefore apparent that the theory views politics as activities and structures of a system and not only structures (Mahajan, 2013). Therefore, when the gatekeepers (Stakeholders) allow corrupt demands of greed, selfishness, nepotism, ethnic chauvinism, embezzlement, etc. into the system, it will only be natural as the saying goes; “garbage in, garbage out”. However, to that extent, the output will definitely be underdevelopment which has plague the Nigerian economy in particular and the African economy in general.

IV. Background of Corruption in Nigeria

As at the time of the political Independence of Nigeria in 1960, corruption has so much infiltrated the habits of politicians and this was revealed in the series of commissions of inquiry instituted by Major General AguyiIrons in the affairs of Electric Corporation of Nigeria, Nigeria Airways Authority, Nigeria Railways Corporation and Nigeria Ports Authority. The reports indicted some noble politicians like OkotieEboh, R. Njoku, Ribanu and Ikejiani as well as Chief Dafe who was indicted for not “knowing the difference between Nigerian Airways and the NCNC party headquarters”(WAAC, 1966).

Ministers and political office holders were very notorious for one corrupt practice or the other. The Minister of Finance, Chief Festus OkotieEboh in defense of his accusation of corruption quoted from the Holy Bible that: To those that have, more shall be given...” (Federal House of rep. Debates, 1965), while the Minister of Aviation, Dr. K.O..Mbadiwe, informed the Legislature that he got his wealth from “Sources known and unknown.” Chief Samuel Akintola was nicknamed “Rigging.” Ahmadu Bello was noted for expensive dressing, using ill-gotten wealth to maintain the assumed “most elaborate wardrobe in the world (Afro-Orbis 2005). Dr. Ikejiani, who was the Chairman of Nigerian Railway Corporation was not only found guilty of misallocation of funds, the panel recommended that he would “never again hold public office.”

(Report of the Tribunal of inquiry 1960-65). In fact he exaggerated the cost of pactfor building of Railway Medical Center from 75.00 to 440.00 pounds.

It is necessary to point out that corruption was the major justification specified by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu for executing the maiden coup d'état in Nigeria's political chronology, however, he tried to persuade Nigerians to believe that, their enemies are the political embezzlers, the cheats, the citizens in all levels of authority that seek kickbacks and demand bribes. People that strive to maintain division in the country in order to maintain their offices in government and their position in the societal stratum, the ethnic chauvinists, nepotism enthusiasts, people who paint fake pictures of the country before the international community that does not reflect the reality on ground; corrupt citizens who have promoted corruption in the society through their words and action (Nzekwe, 1994).

Actually, prior to 1966, expressions like rigging, kick-back, "you scratch my back, I scratch your back", "ten percenters", "inducement", have become household terms of the political bourgeois. According to Michael Crowther,, the political class had earned practically disdain for their corruption, extravagance and lack of commitment for their constituents and the electorates. (Crowther, 1962).

However, the initiative by Major General Aguiyi Ironsi to control corruption came to an sudden end in July 1966 with the coup d'état that introduced General Yakubu Gowon's military junta.

V. Incidences of Corruption in Nigeria's Power Sector

Koledoye, Jumah and Philips (2012), submitted that the following corruption occurrences are branded with the Nigeria power sector in recent times:

First, the Sixteen (16) billion-Naira corruption scam that shook the power sector during the Obasanjo administration; this occurrence up till date has not been investigated and the culprits are not arraigned, hence, no effort at recovery of the loot has been attempted. This laxity in justice administration is basically due to high level corruption and incompetence of the Nigerian government and that of the judicial process.

Secondly, the suspected N5.2 billion scam linked to some principal staff of Rural Electrification Agency (REA); some staff of the Ministry of Power and some federal legislators This incidence resulted in the halting of operations of REA in 2009 three years after it was established under the auspices of the Power Sector Reform Agenda in 2006.

Thirdly, the case involving the N88 billion PHCN workers' pension fund that accumulated from the 7.5% deductions from workers salary which triggered distortion in the power reform process;

Fourthly, the issue of disbursing huge amount of state funds into the power sector in the guise of modifications by the Federal government for decades without substantial evidence of enhancement in the sector is definitely corruption. Koledoye et al (2012), stated that the Nigerian Government maintains that it has expended up to the tune of \$2 billion per annum for the sustenance of the electricity sector which generates a stagnated power capacity of 2000MW over that period. However, if a huge amount of about \$40 billion genuinely allocated to public power sector over the past two decades, certainly, there should be substantial evidence-based development in the sector, and the set of \$3.5 billion venture per annum for the next decade would increase the production capacity to about 40,000MW, as anticipated in the reforms agenda.

Fifthly, the supposed corruption leveled against Prof. Barth Nnaji (former Minister of Power) which involves the collection of N395 million from PHCN (supposedly allocated to the broadcasting sector for 3 months), disbursement of N280 million from PHCN (supposedly for the Nigerian Military), collection of N200 million from PHCN for an undisclosed venture in the Ministry of Power, collection of N86 million from PHCN for an armored car, etc. These are signs of deep-rooted fraud matrix in the organs of government and in the corridors of power.

Sixthly, is the controversial notion in various sectors which held that the bidding procedure that resulted the choice of favorite dealers for the privatization of ten power distribution and five power generation companies in October, 2013 was branded with corruption and irregularities. The notion took a firm perspective after Delta, Edo and Ekiti states Governors openly complained against the preference of Vigeo Power Consortium as the chosen dealer for the Benin

Electricity Distribution Company over other corporations that possessed higher qualifications and were more knowledgeable of the environment (Wunmi, 2013).

VI. Factors Liable for the Sustenance of Corruption

6.1 Colonialism

The achievement of independence by African states did not put to an end the classical domineering and authoritarian style of governance. The administrative approach embraced by African political class and bureaucratic leaders after independence divulges a striking semblance of colonial administrative approach. Present-day African political office holders and technocrats seem to have adopted the authoritative nature of administration related to their colonial masters, in spite of its disapproval among the colonies during the period, and complied to a only somewhat relaxed variety of the colonial authoritarian character (Leonard 1991). Similar to the colonial master, these elites have been linked with dictatorship and, most prominent, an nearly total disrespect for the constitution and its provisions. Further, they have used their offices of authority to exploit state resources which was typical of the colonial masters. Specifically, they have displayed public disrespect for the constitution with impunity, a defiance which is largely accountable for the incessant corruption that typifies most present-day African democracies.

6.2 Ethnic Chauvinism

It has been recommended that ethnic bigotry impact corruption by limiting the prevalent will to oppose corrupt politicians (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Banerjee and Pande, 2007). The bane of contention is that restructuring across ethnic affiliations (Burgess et al., 2009, and Franck and Rainer, 2011) makes people support aspirants from their own ethnic group, regardless of the fact the candidate has clear records of corrupt practices. Probably, embracing of top rank corruption – i.e. corruption among the political elites – could then decipher into a larger accommodation of corruption among lower-ranking public officers also. By means of these apparatuses related to ethnic chauvinism, the society jeopardies being verminous by corruption.

6.3 Prolonged Military Dictatorship

According to the popular saying, Power is likely to corrupt and total power corrupts totally, however, the martial government is not voted into power by the electorates therefore military intrusion into the political affairs at any level of the state is toxic to the wellbeing of the democracy, political stability and transparency of the polity given its dictatorship disposition. As stated by Transparency International (as cited in Majeed & MacDonald, 2010), a former Indonesian leader Suharto up to the tune of \$15-35 billion from his state's treasury, also General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Mobutu Democratic Republic of Congo and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, every one of them must have misappropriated up to the tune of \$5 billion. However, it is pertinent to note that all of these leaders, excluding Ferdinand Marcos, were military general connoting that military engagement in politics is characterized by corruption and underdevelopment.

VII. The Nexus between Corruption and Development

Development and Corruption are two separate concepts and effect on each other differently. The basis of this assertion borne out of the severe effect corruption impacts on the actualization of development. Some researchers have contended that corruption, good or bad, to the economic growth of a given nation depending on the structural establishment of its institutions. Mironov (2005) firmly submitted in support of this assertion by stating that corruption which is unassociated with other administrative features, is directly associated to the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in countries with poor structures. He further opined that bad corruption which is connected to weak structures has adverse impact on gross domestic product growth (*ibid*). The good corruption usually enhances economic growth particularly when there is incompetent administration and stiff procedures. Good

corruption could lubricate the wheels by permitting persons to conquer red-tapeism and advance efficacy, only in the scenario when the individual costs related with guidelines overshadow the public interest (Minorov, 2005).

On the flip side, corruption influences the existence of people and their growth in several dimensions. For instance, majority of governments divert their expenditure from public investments like education and health and tends to upsurge public expenses on capital intensive ventures that would yield more avenues for kickbacks such as security contracts and down play public service delivery (World Bank, 2001). Todaro (1977) connected development with economic growth, corruption therefore has direct penalties on both the economy and the politics of every state.

VIII. Corruption versus Economic Development

Brempong (2002) explains that corruption has a contrary and statistically important effect on the proportion of progress of revenue in Africa: A single point rise in corruption reduces the progress rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by between 0.75 and 0.9 percentage points per year and of per capita income growth rate by between 0.39 and 0.41 percentage points per year, respectively. According to Bloom, Sachs, Collier & Udry (1998), the enthusiasm of Africa's track to growth after independence, specifically in the 1960s, has developed to a disappointment in present-day world as a result of Africa's weak economic output. African per capita income growth averaged 1.5 percent in the 1960s, 0.8 percent in the 1970s, and -1.2 percent in the 1980s.

Studies of industrial companies over the past decade have shown that tycoons in Kenya find corruption a massive impediment to progressive business (Kimuyu, 2007). Companies in Kenya spend an average of about 7.5% of their yearly sales on bribes. Entrepreneurs in the machinery segment pay the maximum bribes, totaling higher than 20.4% of their yearly income. Industries in the wood and furniture sector likewise have to make very exorbitant payments of about 13% of their income on corrupt practices (Kimuyu, 2007). Abimbola (2007) points out that project implementation as an additional podium in which corruption is very practical. He observes that, despite the fact that Ajaokuta Steel Company (in Nigeria) has been under construction for over seventeen years and has cost the government seven billion dollars, unfortunately, not a single steel has been produced.

Mauro (1995) opines that, corruption decreases business profits and economic development. He emphasizes that there is persistent adverse affiliation between corruption on the one hand and investment and growth on the other. He further states that giving a bribe may develop into a tradition to a point that civil servants intentionally employ delay strategies of process in order to receive inducement. He contends that while the need for inducement may avert delays for a person or group, they may surge the needless and overwhelming administrative procedures in the economy of a country.

According to *the World Bank (1998)*:

*Bribery raises transactions costs and uncertainty in an economy.
Bribery leads to inefficient economic outcomes. It impedes long-term foreign and domestic investment, misallocates talent to rent-seeking activities, and distorts sectorial priorities and technology choices (by, for example, creating incentives to contract for large defense projects rather than rural health clinics specializing in preventive care). It pushes firms underground, undercuts the state's ability to raise revenues, and leads to ever-higher tax rates being levied on fewer and fewer, taxpayers.
This, in turn, reduces states' ability to provide essential public goods, including the rule of law. A vicious circle of increasing corruption underground economic activity can result.*

Mo (2001) states that a 1% rise in the rate of corruption results in a 0.72% reduction in economic development. He recognizes political instability as a very crucial aspect and means in which corruption influences economic progress. Bardhan (1997) fails to see substance in contention regarding a favourable relationship between corruption and economic development. He emphasizes that, individuals do not have to take a moralistic standing on corruption to realize that discussions in favour of the positive effects of corruption are burdened with general problems.

IX. Corruption versus Socio - Political Development

Military intrusion in Nigerian political history from the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s was allegedly an outcome of the shameless corruption practiced by Nigerian politicians. The enthronement of democracy in the late 1990s was attained on the platform of the war declared against corruption. Conversely, in present day, the feeling of disappointment and betrayal with the democratic administration is based on prevalent corrupt practices among politicians and other public office holders which dealt a blow of unprecedented hardship on the people (Sardan, 1999).

African states still wallow in abject poverty and there is this anxiety that emerging development and projections of continued growth might be erased by advanced and established corruption (Olowu, 1999). Therefore, it is on this premise that Obayelu (2007) contends that corruption has become prevalent to the level that it has become legitimate and one of the principles of governance. In the developing world, Africa, takes the back seat when it comes to enhancement of welfare of its citizens. The African continent stands as an archetype of countries whose growth has been heavily truncated and restrained by corruption (Lawal, 2007). The continent's failure to combat corruption to a standstill has smeared its image in the international community scaring away local and foreign entrepreneurs.

The nationwide corruption survey, the Nigeria Corruption Index (2007), branded the Nigerian Police Force and the Power Holding Company of Nigeria, (PHCN) (Obayelu: 2007) as the organizations in the country with the most advanced corrupt practices. The police Force, which is supposed to bring corrupt individual or groups to justice, unfortunately occupies the position of the most corrupt organization.

Studies and findings from different countries verify the threats corruption poses towards the attainment of good governance and development. Johnson (2000) puts forward that corruption deteriorates political institutions and mass participation in good governance which in return destroys economic growth. It is proved in the analytic surveys of corruption in Bosnia, Ghana, Indonesia and Honduras that government institutions with the highest rates of corruption apparently deliver less value of services. Inferior value service specifies poverty and underdevelopment (Chetwynd, et al, 2003).

X. 10. Conclusion

Corruption in the Nigeria's power sector has arrived at very alarming magnitudes and therefore a so much is to be done to prevent escalation. The establishment of corruption has developed into a very serious issue in Nigeria with weighty adverse penalties on socio-economic, and political development. The war on corruption needs to be intensified and there must be no retreat or surrender if Nigeria must make it out of this quagmire. To this extent, the Nigerian government, African governments, international organizations, and foreign governments must intensify their efforts to prove and ensure that corrupt practices would cease to be attractive or beneficial within or outside Africa. In order to tame corruption in the power sector, it is pertinent that much attention be paid to ethical political leadership; put differently, a new sociopolitical morality (Perry, 1997; Ruzindana, 1997). Ethical political leaders should possess the moral credibility and the ability to motivate the society and inspire institutions to pursue the objectives of moral, responsible and transparent governance to boost national development through availability of prepaid meters for all consumers and maintenance of electricity distribution channels for sufficient availability of electricity supply. Furthermore, other public office holders will not reduce or shun their corrupt behaviours unless their political elite stake the frontline in the war against corruption by demonstrating the essential ethical and moral

behaviour. Curtailing corruption in Nigeria, also needs to be more closely connected to the advantages of good governance and a vibrant civil society. Responsive and responsible governance incorporates the following perspectives: accountability, openness and transparency, and predictability and the rule of law (Brautigam, 1992). This is an aspect that needs to be reinforced in Nigeria where, regardless of progress on the electoral front, as regards administration change, the institutions of democratic government and their connection to civil society, which should provide the background for good governance, remains feeble (Hope, 1997; Bratton, 1997). Promoting good governance and authorizing civil society are hence indispensable rudiments in the fight to resist corruption in Nigeria and Africa in general (Hope, 1997; Johnston, 1997).

Finally, if sustainable development must be achieved in the power sector, and Nigeria as a whole, corruption has to be branded and made a very risky venture. A very risky venture in the sense that offenders when apprehended would be severely penalized, regardless of their positions on the societal stratum. Further, disciplinary mechanisms, including appropriate laws and adequate capacity for investigation and enforcement, only work in synergy with preventive measures that create a disabling environment for corruption. Nevertheless, punishment, especially of high-profile corrupt officers, serves as a deterrent, and a very strong signal throughout the country that the war against corruption is fully activated.

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